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Abstract
Many recent works have investigated the question of extending a
preference over a set of alternatives to its power set, as a way to pro-
vide a formal representation of the notion of freedom of choice. In
general, the results are limited to the nite case, which excludes the
case of economic environments. This paper deals with the possibility
of extending those results to the context where the basic set of alter-
natives is the n-dimensional Euclidean space. We present an extension
of the leximax criterion of Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (1994) on this
more general framework. This characterization result opens the possi-
bility of application of the literature on freedom of choice to standard
economic environments.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this work is to investigate an extension of a preference over
a set (possibly innite) of alternatives to its power set. The motivation
for that extension ts in the freedom of choice framework. According to
this approach, the level of well-being enjoyed by an individual is determined
by the utility achieved, given the available set of alternatives (instrumental
value) and by the degree of freedom achieved from that opportunity set
(intrinsic value).
There has been many relevant works on this eld in recent times, start-
ing from the very notion of freedom of choice which harks back to Hicks
(1959), Buchanan (1986), Dasgupta (1986) and Sen (1988, 1991a, 1991b).
The slightly dierent and closely related notion of preference for flexibility
appears rst in Koopmans (1964), Kreps (1979) and Arrow (1994) and is
developed axiomatically in Arlegi and Nieto (2000a,2000b).
In Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (1994) several rules to compare subsets
of alternatives (opportunities) of a given set are dened and characterized
by axioms; one of theses rules is called leximax. According to this rule,
any pair of sets of alternatives are compared by looking rst at the best
alternative in each set; if this comparison is not decisive, then the rule looks
at the second-best alternative, and the procedure continues up to the point
in which there are no more alternatives to be compared in one or both sets.
In the rst case, the set with more alternatives is declared to be better; in
the second one, both sets are indierent.
Unfortunately, the leximax rule, as established in Bossert, Pattanaik and
Xu (1994), is dened only when the universe of alternatives is nite. This
domain restriction leaves no room for economic environments, in which a):
the universe of alternatives is the positive orthant of the n-fold cartesian
product, and b): individual preferences over this set is a continuos and
complete preorder. In this case, all of the dierent rules presented in Bossert,
Pattanaik and Xu -including the leximax rule- do not apply. Furthermore,
in the consumer theory, comparisons among budget sets are made on the
sole basis of the indirect utility, and this leaves apart any kind of freedom
of choice considerations. This paper tries to ll up this gap extending the
notion of freedom of choice to the case in which the basic set of alternatives
is the Euclidean Space. We rst establish some independent axioms (which
are equivalent in spirit to the ones in Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu), applied to
economic environments. We provide also a denition of the leximax criterion
extended to the continuum case and we prove a characterization theorem in
2
economic environments.
The plan of the paper goes as follows: In Section 2 there are nota-
tions and denitions. Section 3 contains the axioms and some relevant facts
deduced from them. Section 4 establishes the main result as well as the
independence of the axioms, and Section 5 concludes the paper with some
comments and remarks.
2 Notation and denitions
IR will denote the set of all real numbers, being IRn its n-fold cartesian
product. Let X  IRn be a nonempty set of alternatives. In order to ensure
that the axioms used in the characterization are independent, it is assumed
that in X there are at least three elements.
Let R be a complete, reflexive, transitive and continuous ordering on
X , being I the indierence relation and P the strict preference relation
associated to R.
The set of all subsets of X is denoted by 2X , and : will denote the logical
negation.
Let  2X  2X be a preference relation dened on 2X . We write
A  B to indicate that the set A is preferred to B. We assume that  is
asymmetric and negatively transitive, so  dened by A  B i :(B  A)
is an ordering (complete and transitive) on 2X , and the associated relation
 is an equivalence relation. We will assume A  ;, for all A  X , A 6= ;.
We investigate possible preferences over sets of alternatives consistent
with a given preference structure over the basic alternatives. The formal
meaning of consistency will be given by the axioms contained in the next
section.
3 The axioms
On the relation between the preference structure on X and the ordering
over 2X we impose the following properties
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Total-Freedom Dominance (TFD)
Let two A;B be two innite sets, A;B  X , if for all a 2 A there exists
b 2 B such that bRa, then B  A.
Independence (In)
For all A;B  X , for all y; z 2 X , such that yIz, z 62 A, and y 62 B,
then
A  B () A [ fzg  B [ fyg:
Robustness (Rb)
For all A;B; C  X , such that C\(A[B) = ; and vering that 8a 2 A,
8b 2 B and 8c 2 C, aPc and bRc, then
A  B =) A  B [ C
Interpretation
(TFD) guarantees, for any pair of sets A and B with an innite number
of elements, and such that for all a 2 A there exists an element b 2 B
verifying bRa, then b is almost as prefered as A. That is, in the case where
A and B provide with the same degree of freedom because both contain an
innite number of elements, then Pareto Dominance applies.
(In) shares the same spirit as the Independence axiom of Pattanaik and
Xu (1990), but in a weaker form. It says in words that by adding to (or
dropping from) sets A;B two indierent alternatives, the preference over
those sets will not be reversed. When y = z, then the axiom looks very
much like one of Pattanaik and Xu (1990), or Bossert (1992).
Finally, according to (Rb), it is ensured that when a set whose alterna-
tives are worse than all the alternatives in A [B is added to the worse set,
B, then the ordering between A and B will not change. This is very similar
to the axiom Robustness of Strict Preference used by Bossert (1992) and
Bossert-Pattanaik-Xu (1994) extended to the case in which what we add is
not a single alternative but a set of alternatives.
Consequences
As a consequence of the denition of (In) it is easy to observe that for
all A;B 2 2X , for all y1; : : : ; yk 2 X , z1; : : : ; zk 2 X such that yiIzi, zi 62 A,
and yi 62 B, i = 1; : : :k, then
A  B () A [ fz1; : : : ; zkg  B [ fy1; : : : ; ykg:
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As a consequence of the denition of (Rb), we obtain the property of
Extension (E): for all x; y 2 X , xPy () fxg  fyg. In order to prove it,
consider A = fxg, B = ; and C = fyg.
(E) is a very standard axiom in the eld. It simply says that the pref-
erence over alternatives is extended to singletons when the quality of the
alternatives matters in comparing opportunity sets. This is not the case in
some approaches where only the number of alternatives matters in the com-
parison of opportunity sets. Thus, Pattanaik and Xu (1990) studied a case
in which the freedom of choice attached to a set of opportunities is measured
simply by the number of its alternatives. They assume that there will be
no distinction between sets of alternatives in which there is no freedom of
choice at all, the singletons, for instance, and then they establish that for
all x; y 2 X , fxg  fyg. In our paper it is assumed that the quantity of the
alternatives, as well as their quality, is taken into account when comparing
opportunity sets, and then the property (E) becomes very natural.
Also from the axioms we obtain the following lemmata.
Lemma 1 Let A  X , b 2 X , if for all a 2 A, bPa, then fbg  A.
Proof. As fbg  ;, thus, by (Rb), fbg  A
Lemma 2 Let A;B  X , A nite and B 6= ;, then A [ B  A.
Proof. As B  ;, thus, by (In), A [B  A.
4 A characterization result
We are now prepared to propose an ordering of opportunity sets that
satises the above axioms, and that is the only one that accomplishes such
a list of properties. We call that ordering the leximax ordering on 2X and
it will be denoted by L. Both, this name, leximax, and the notation L,
appear before in Bossert(1992) and Bossert-Pattanaik-Xu (1994), but unlike
these works in our context refer to an ordering on 2X , where X can be
innite.
In order to dene the criterion L, a piece of adittional notation will be
useful. Let uR : X ! [0; 1] be such that for all x; y 2 X , uR(x)  uR(y) i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xRy. (The assumptions on R are sucient conditions to guarantee that uR
does exist as a utility representation for R).
Let A  X , as u(A) is a bounded set, there exists supu(A). If there exists
a 2 A such that u(a) = supu(A), this a will be denoted by a1. In this case,
if we consider the bounded set u(Anfa1g), then there exists supu(Anfa1g);
again, if there exists a 2 A n fa1g such that u(a) = supu(A n fa1g), this a
will be denoted by a2, and so on.
Then, given a set X (possibily innite), the leximax ordering on 2X is
dened as follows: let A;B  X be two sets of alternatives, there could be
three possibilities:
1) There exists a1 and there does not exist b1.
If for all x 2 B a1Px, then A L B.
If there exists x 2 B such that xPa1, then B L A.
2) There do not exist both a1 and b1.
If supu(A) > supu(B), then A L B.
If supu(B) > supu(A), then B L A.
If supu(A) = supu(B) then A L B.
3) There exist a1 and b1.
If a1Pb1, then A L B.
If b1Pa1, then B L A.
If a1Ib1, we repeat the same procedure for a2 and b2, that is, we consider
the setsAnfa1g and Bnfb1g, and so on. In the case where there exist ak 2 A,
bk 2 B such that akIbk, for all k 2 IN , then A L B.
Note that if each set A is identied with the sequence in [0; 1], U(A) =
fu(a1); u(a2); : : : ; u(ako); supu(A n fa1; : : :akog); 0; : : :g, in order to relate a
pair of sets A and B, we are, in fact, using the lexicografhic ordering between
U(A) and U(B), with the restriction that if there exist ak and bk, for k =
1; : : :ko, akIbk, and there exists ako+1 but there do not exist bko+1 and
u(ako+1) = supu(B n fb1; : : : ; bkog), then A L B, instead of checking the
next elements of both U(A) and U(B).
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The main result of the paper is the following:
Theorem 1 Let  be an ordering on 2X.
 satises (TFD), (In) and (Rb) if and only if =L.
Proof. It is easy to prove that L satises (TFD), (In) and (Rb). We
will prove that, if  is an ordering on 2X verifying (TFD), (In) and (Rb),
then =L.
We start supposing that A L B and then we will prove that A  B.
There could be three cases:
(a) there exist ak 2 A; bk 2 B for all k 2 IN with akIbk, for all k 2 IN ,
or
(b) there exists ko 2 IN such that there exist ak 2 A; bk 2 B, for
all k < ko, vering akIbk, there does not exist ako 2 A; bko 2 B, and
supu(A n fa1; : : : ; ako−1g) = supu(B n fb1; : : : ; bko−1g).
(c) There do not exist a1 and b1 and supu(A) = supu(B).
In the case (a), by (E) fa1g  fa1g, and by (In) A  B In the case (b),
by (TFD) A n fa1; : : : ; ako−1g  B n fb1; : : : ; bko−1g, and by (In) A  B. In
the case (c), applying directly (TFD) we have A  B.
We will suppose now that A L B, and we will proof that A  B.
Suppose that there exists ko 2 IN such that there exist ak 2 A; bk 2 B, for
all k < ko, with akIbk. There could be the next possibilities,
(a) there exist ako 2 A; bko 2 B with akoPbko ;
(b) there exists ako 2 A, there do not exist bko 2 B and akoPx, for all
x 2 B n fb1; : : : ; bko−1g;
(c) there does not exist ako 2 A, there exists bko 2 B and there exists
a 2 A n fa1; : : : ; ako−1g such that aPbko ;
(d) there does not exist ako 2 A; bko 2 B and supu(A n fa1; : : : ; ako−1g) >
supu(B n fb1; : : : ; bko−1g).
First, note that if ko = 1, the four cases are analogous.
Otherwise, in the case (a), by using (E), (In) and (Rb), we have the
chain of consequences, fakog  fbkog =) fa1; : : : ; akog  fb1; : : : ; bkog =)
fa1; : : : ; akog  B, on the other hand, by lemma 2, A  fa1; : : : ; akog, then
A  B.
In case (b), by using lemma 1, fakog  B n fb1; : : : ; bko−1g, and by (In)
fa1; : : : ; akog  B. By using lemma 2 we obtain A  fa1; : : : ; akog, thus
A  B.
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In case (c) by using (E), (In) and (Rb), we obtain fag  fbkog =)
fa1; : : : ; ako−1; ag  fb1; : : : ; bkog =) fa1; : : : ; ako−1; ag  B, and by using
lemma 2, A  fa1; : : : ; ako−1; ag, then A  B.
In case (d), supu(A n fa1; : : : ; ako−1g) > supu(B n fb1; : : : ; bko−1g), im-
plies that there exists a 2 A n fa1; : : : ; ako−1g such that aPb for all b 2
B n fb1; : : : ; bko−1g and then, by using the lemma 1 and (In), we have the
chain of consequences fag  B n fb1; : : : ; bko−1g =) fa1; : : : ; ako−1; ag  B,
and with lemma 2 again, A  B.
5 Remarks
The result presented in Theorem 1 can be seen as an extension of the
leximax rule of Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (1994) to economic environments.
An economic environment is dened as the case in which the universal set
of alternatives is the Euclidean space and the decision makers preferences
over this domain are continuous. Even though the leximax procedure is
usually dened for the nite case, this paper presents a suitable extension
to the continuous case. In this extension we use the fact that the sets to
be compared are bounded having then suprema. The comparison among
sets applies the lexicographic procedure to a nite list of (possibly innite)
bounded sets.
Notice that, in some cases, the leximax rule characterized in this paper
enables to show the intrinsic value of freedom of choice, while the standard
indirect utility rule does not. For example, let A be a classical budget set,
with a1 its best alternative according to relation R (see gure 1). According
to the standard criterion of the consumer theory, A  fa1g, while according
with the leximax, A  fa1g.
By the other hand, let A and B two budget sets, B  A such their best
alternative according R agrees, a1 = b1 (see gure 2). According both of
them, the standard criterion and the leximax rule, A  B. Note that this
seems to contradict the idea of freedom of choice, but can also be interpreted
from other point of view, keeping with the spirit of freedom of choice. In
fact the reasons for A be indierent B are, rst, there are the same quantity
of alternatives in A than in B, and, second, these alternatives are equally
desired, that is, for each alternative in A, dierent that a1, there is some
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alternative in B better than it, and reciprocally.
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A
a1=b1
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Figure 1 Figure 2
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